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The European Court of Justice Rules on
Keyword Ads and Trademark Rights
DAVID FRANKLYN*
On March 22, 2010, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
issued a decision finding Google not liable for trademark
infringement in the context of its Ad Words program. The European
Court of Justice issued its long-anticipated decision in the three
Google AdWords cases referred to it by the French Cour de
Cassation.2 The ruling only answers the questions posed to it by the
Cour de Cassation. Nevertheless, the ECJ's decision should be
favorable to Google and other keyword advertising vendors
throughout Europe.
Under Google's keyword program, Google allows potential
advertisers to "bid" on a keyword that, when entered by a searcher,
will then link a searcher to an advertisement sponsored by the bidder;
once the searcher clicks on the ad, the searcher is directed to the
bidder's website. 3 For example, Mercedes Benz may purchase the
words "luxury automobiles" as a keyword that produces paid
advertisements for Mercedes Benz cars. Anyone who types "luxury
automobiles" into a Google search will then see Mercedes Benz's
advertisement-either in a shaded area at the top left-hand side of the
screen or in a shaded area on the right side of the screen.4 Usually
these will occur under the heading of "Sponsored Links." The more
money the bidder agrees to pay for a particular hit, the higher up on
the list of sponsored links it will be.5
Sometimes, however, the purchased keyword involves a
trademark. For example, Mercedes Benz may purchase the
trademark "Infiniti" as a keyword. Although Infiniti is a competitor
of Mercedes Benz and Mercedes Benz may be purchasing Infiniti's
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1. Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237-08 & C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 119 (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008J0236:EN:HTML.
2. Id.
3. See Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1327, 1339-40 (2008)
(describing the auctioning, linkng, and payment process of Google AdWords).
4. See id. at 1343-44 (noting that links for the search tearn "nike" were found both at the
top left of the screen and right side of the screen as "Sponsored Links").
5. See id. at 1339-40 (discussing the proportionality of payment and link placement of
Goto.com, the business model of which Google duplicated).
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mark as a keyword precisely to direct internet users away from
Infiniti and to Mercedes Benz, Google has allowed this practice to
occur. Trademark owners have sued Google-and rival purchasers of
their marks as Google search keywords-on the theory that such uses
confuse consumers as to the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of
goods and thus constitute trademark infringement. 6 These lawsuits
have been brought in the United States and abroad, most notably in
the European Union.
In the United States, Google and other search engines have
argued that they are not liable for trademark infringement as a matter
of law (even if there is consumer confusion) because they are not
using the plaintiffs' marks as source identifiers for their own goods or
services.7 According to Google, when they make trademarks available
as keyword search terms, that "making available" is not an actionable
trademark use in and of itself. U.S. Courts, however, have definitively
rejected this as an absolute defense. 8
Instead, courts have held that Google is using the questioned
marks "in commerce" and that that is the only "use" prerequisite in
the Lanham Act.9 That being the case, in the U.S. Google may still
face liability for including trademarks in its AdWords/Sponsored
Links program if the use of these trademarks by bidders ultimately
causes consumer confusion. Moreover, such confusion is likely to be
determined under the notoriously fuzzy "initial interest confusion"
doctrine, which attaches liability to uses that cause initial diversion or
confusion even if by the point of purchase such confusion has
dissipated."' Google will, therefore, have to handle these cases on a
case-by-case basis with the threat of liability hinging on the facts of
each particular case.
Google's potential exposure for selling trademarks as keywords
appears to be significantly lower in continental Europe after the
recent ECJ ruling. The ECJ has ruled that Google is not liable for
trademark infringement when an advertiser purchases a keyword
6. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Google Inc. v.
Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450
(N.D. Cal 2007); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004).
7. See Lastowka, supra note 3, at 1384-89 (discussing trademark infringement in the
context of internet search results).
8. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rescuecorn rejected the argument
advanced by Google and its amici (a group of law professors), and accepted by a number of
district courts in the Second Circuit, that the inclusion of a trademark in an internal computer
directory cannot constitute trademark use. Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 129-30. Most
commentators believe that Rescuecom effectively killed the "no trademark use" defense in such
cases. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan, The Future of Internet Content and Services: Beyond
Trademark Use, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 135 (2010): Jessica A.E. McKinney,
Note. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.: A Conscious Analytical Shift, 95 IOWA L. REV. 281
(2009).
9. Rescuecomn Corp., 562 F.3d at 129-30.
10. See Brookfield Commc'ns., Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036. 1061-66
(9th Cir. 1999).
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based on a competitor's trademark to trigger a search ad, so long as
Google removes the infringing ads promptly when notified by brand
owners."' Bidder/advertisers can still be held liable under a likelihood
of confusion test, but actionable confusion is limited to situations
where the search ad makes it "impossible, or possible only with
difficulty, for average internet users to establish from what
undertaking the good or services covered by the ad originate."' 12 The
ECJ stated that it is up to national European Courts to decide
consumer confusion issues on a case by case basis. 3
The ECJ decision is good for Google in the sense that it seems to
largely shield Google from liability (so long as it follows the take
down policy), and thus gives it something the U.S. courts refused to
give it. But the ECJ decision could also be bad for Google in that it
more clearly endorses the possibility that search term bidders could
be liable for trademark infringement. This could lead to a chilling
effect on the purchase of trademarks as search terms which could
then result in lower revenues for Google. It is hard to tell whether the
decision will have that effect, given the other impediments to such
suits. For now, though, I would say this is a win for Google.
The most useful parts of the ECJ decision can be found in the
following paragraphs:
[1.] Article 5(1)(a) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21
December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States
relating to trade marks and Article 9(1)(a) of Council Regulation
(EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade
mark must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a trade
mark is entitled to prohibit an advertiser from advertising, on the
basis of a keyword identical with that trade mark which that
advertiser has, without the consent of the proprietor, selected in
connection with an internet referencing service, goods or services
identical with those for which that mark is registered, in the case
where that advertisement does not enable an average internet
user, or enables that user only with difficulty, to ascertain whether
the goods or services referred to therein originate from the
proprietor of the trade mark or an undertaking economically
connected to it or, on the contrary, originate from a third party.
[2.] An internet referencing service provider which stores, as a
keyword, a sign identical with a trade mark and organises the
display of advertisements on the basis of that keyword does not
use that sign within the meaning of Article 5(1) and (2) of
Directive 89/104 or of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 40/94.
[3.] Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
11. Joined Cases C-236/08. C-237-08 & C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA. 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 119, at *1-3 (Mar. 23, 2010).
12. Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, Google has not infringed
trade mark law by allowing advertisers to purchase keywords corresponding to their
competitors' trade marks. No. 32/10 (Mar. 23. 2010).
13. Joined Cases C-236/08. C-237-08 & C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA. 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 119, at *48 (Mar. 23, 2010).
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commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic
commerce') must be interpreted as meaning that the rule laid
down therein applies to an internet referencing service provider in
the case where that service provider has not played an active role
of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data
stored. If it has not played such a role, that service provider cannot
be held liable for the data which it has stored at the request of an
advertiser, unless, having obtained knowledge of the unlawful
nature of those data or of that advertiser's activities, it failed to act
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the data
concerned.
14
The first paragraph essentially holds that key word advertisers
(as opposed to Google) are liable for trademark infringement if they
purchase keywords and link them to ads in situations where the ad
would not enable "an average internet user" to determine from what
"undertaking" the goods originate "without difficulty."' 5 I suspect this
will be harder to prove than American-style "initial interest"
confusion (which in some jurisdictions seems to allow for advertiser
liability when there is diversion), 16 but easier to prove than traditional
likelihood of confusion. I think this holding is sensible given the
difficulties inherent in determining initial interest confusion.
The second paragraph holds that Google does not make a legally
significant use of a trademark merely through the sale of keywords. 7
Said another way, it essentially holds that Google is not "using" a
trademark in commerce when it merely makes it available for sale as
a keyword. 8 I disagree with this finding. The sale of trademarks as
keywords to purchasers whom Google knows are buying those marks
to attract consumers to their own sites-i.e., in order to sow confusion
in the on-line marketplace and even to sell clearly counterfeit
goods-is part and parcel of Google's business plan.
Through this business plan, Google is actively facilitating and
profiting from confusion. The ECJ opinion almost seems quaint and
naive in suggesting/holding that Google is normally merely passive
when confusion occurs in the first instance. It seems to ignore the fact
that Google's own website for AdWords gives advice to consumers on
which keywords they might want to buy, including the names of their
competitors. 9 The ECJ opinion also seems to ignore that Google is
making a lot of money by not only facilitating on-line confusion but
14. hi. at *1-3.
15. Id. at *1-2.
16. See, e.g.. Playboy Enters.. Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
2004); Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).
17. Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237-08 & C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 119, at *2 (Mar. 23, 2010).
1& Id.
19. See Google, Google AdWords: Keyword Tool.
https://adwords.google.com/select/KeywordToolExternal?defaultView=2 (last visited Apr. 25.
2010) (allowing users to enter a search term to see what results would come up under a keyword
search).
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by causing a frenzy of competitive trademark keyword purchasing.
Google's AdWord program incentivizes trademark owners to pay too
much to buy their own marks as keywords in order to try to control
the display of ads on the first page of a Google search result. How
nice for Google. How bad for trademark owners and for consumers
who must pay extra prices for goods and services due to this
unnecessary cost which is undoubtedly passed on to them.
The Second Circuit got it right in Rescuecom when it held that
making trademarks available for sale as keywords is in itself a
potentially actionable "use" of the mark, so long as plaintiffs show
confusion. 211 Making a trademark available for use as a keyword that
ultimately leads to confusion is clearly a "use in commerce" under the
Lanham Act. 21 There is no separate requirement under U.S. law that
the mark be used by the defendant as a source identifier for its own
goods, and there is no articulated reason given by the ECJ opinion as
to why that should not be the case in the EU as well. What is clear is
that Google now has a better legal landscape in the EU. This may
embolden Google to effectuate a more aggressive policy there.
The third paragraph essentially paints Google's role in this
context as fairly passive. If Google steps out of this role and somehow
allows confusion ads to remain posted after being notified of them,
then the ECJ leaves open the possibility that Google can be liable for
the resulting confusion.22 The Court does not explain why Google's
liability should be limited to these circumstances or what would
constitute "knowledge of the unlawful nature of those data or of that
advertiser's activities. '23 Indeed, given the difficulty in accurately
predicting what constitutes confusion in the keyword advertising
context, I wonder how and when Google would ever have such
"knowledge" except in clearly flagged counterfeiting situations.
All in all, the ECJ opinion steers clear of imposing significant
costs on search engines to police trademarks on their sites. While this
may seem to sensibly spare search engines the costs that such policing
would entail, it leaves trademark owners with recourse mostly against
keyword purchasers in the event of confusion. Given that Google is
actively profiting from keyword confusion, its role as a passive and
innocent observer in this context is questionable.
20. Rescuecorn Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2009).
21. Id.
22. Joined Cases C-236/08. C-237-08 & C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 119, at *2-3 (Mar. 23, 2010).
23. Id.

